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I
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, Congress reauthorized the student financial assistance programs of
the Higher Education Act of 1965 (the "HEA").' This "reauthorization"-the
Higher Education Amendments of 1992 (the "HEA Amendments") 2-for the
first time formally provided for a "Program Integrity Triad" of accrediting
agencies, the states, and the Department of Education (the "Department") to
control access, or "gatekeeping," to those programs. Congress also mandated
that regulations to implement the Program Integrity Triad and other provisions
of the legislation be developed through negotiated rulemaking.
This article will review the negotiated rulemaking process used by the
Department of Education and its effect on regulations affecting accreditation.
Part II will summarize the legislation. Part III will explain the concept of
negotiated rulemaking and its accepted attributes. Part III will also describe the
Department's efforts to conduct negotiated rulemaking and assess the success
or failure of those efforts. Part IV will examine the effect of the process on the
regulatory product that resulted.
II
THE HEA AMENDMENTS
A. Program Integrity Triad
Although accreditation by an agency recognized by the Secretary of
Education (the "Secretary"), licensure by the state, and certification by the
Department have long been conditions of institutional eligibility to participate
in the student financial assistance programs, high default rates and abusive
practices of some institutions of higher education impelled Congress in the HEA
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1. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
2. Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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Amendments to specify in much greater detail the gatekeeping responsibilities
of each leg of this Triad.3 Where previously the HEA provided only that the
Secretary was to publish a list of accrediting agencies deemed to be "reliable
authority as to the quality of training offered," section 496 of the HEA now sets
forth in detail the requirements that an accrediting agency must meet if it is to
be recognized by the Secretary.4 These requirements concern the agency's
structure, accrediting standards, and operating procedures. The statute also
addresses the process by which an agency seeks and maintains its recognition.
Structurally, the most noteworthy new requirement is that institutional
accreditors be administratively and financially "separate and independent" from
related trade associations.5 In order to fulfill this requirement, an agency must
show that its members are not elected or selected by the board or chief
executive officer of the affiliated association, that the agency has one public
member for each six members, that dues to the agency are paid separately from
dues to the association, and that the agency's budget is independently
determined.6
The HEA Amendments specify twelve areas that an agency's accrediting
standards must assess. Many of these topics are commonly addressed in
accrediting standards--curriculum, faculty, and facilities, for example. Other
areas would require accrediting agencies to break new ground: They would be
required to assess program length, tuition and fees, completion and placement
rates, default rates, and compliance with Title IV of the HEA.7
Accrediting agencies must demonstrate that they perform regular site visits
to all institutions of higher education and unannounced visits to institutions
providing vocational education and training.' They must require institutions to
submit business'plans when new branches are established, and they must visit
these branches within six months of their establishment.9 The agency is obliged
to apply procedures that "comply with due process," including "adequate
specification of requirements and deficiencies," "notice of an opportunity for a
hearing," a "right to appeal any adverse action," and a "right to representation
by counsel."'" Civil actions challenging accreditation decisions must be
brought in federal district court." The HEA Amendments also mandate
significant new disclosure obligations: First, agencies must notify the Secretary
and the states within thirty days of actions adverse to institutions, including
3. See Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for Recognition of Accrediting Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg.
3,579 (1994) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 602) (proposed Jan. 24, 1994).
4. Compare HEA, Title IV, Part D, § 461, 79 Stat. at 1269, with HEA Amendments, § 499, 106
Stat. at 641.
5. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1099b(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
6. Id. § 1099b(b).
7. Id. § 1099b(a)(5); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2751-2756a (West Supp. 1994) (establishing the terms and
conditions for the student financial assistance program).
8. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1099b(c)(1).
9. Id. § 1099b(c)(2), (3).
10. Id. § 1099b(a)(6).
11. Id. § 1099b(f).
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probation, and second, agencies must provide the Secretary, the state, and the
public with a summary of any review that results in an adverse action as well
the institution's comments regarding that review. 2
Although the HEA Amendments call for the Secretary to provide
procedures for recognition, 3 it specifies a number of the elements of the
recognition process. The Secretary is prohibited from establishing recognition
standards other than those required by the HEA Amendments. 4 The
Secretary is to make an "independent evaluation" of whether the agency has
met the criteria for recognition." In making this evaluation, the Secretary is
to make site visits, unannounced as well as announced, and consider third-party
information, complaints, and legal actions against the accrediting agency.16 The
Secretary may also limit, suspend, or terminate an agency's recognition after
notice and opportunity for a hearing.'7
The statutory provisions on the state leg of the Triad are also pertinent to
the role of accrediting agencies under the HEA. Section 494 of the HEA
Amendments creates a new state postsecondary review program ("SPRP")
funded by the federal government." Under this program, each state designates
a state postsecondary review entity ("SPRE"), to conduct reviews of institutions
that meet certain criteria, such as default rates above minimum thresholds, in
order to determine continued eligibility to participate in the student aid
programs.' 9 The SPREs apply review standards that overlap in many respects
with accrediting standards.2' When an institution comes up for review,
however, the SPRE must contract with "the appropriate approved accrediting
agency ... or another peer review system" to assess the "quality and content
of the institution's courses or programs of instruction, training, or study."2'
The provisions on accrediting agency recognition and the SPRP are the
product of a legislative compromise. An early version of the House reauthoriza-
tion bill would have eliminated the role of accrediting agencies as gatekeepers
to the student aid programs, substituting expanded state oversight in their
place.22 Ultimately, accreditation was retained as a requirement of eligibility.
However, the requirements for recognition expanded as described above, and
the increased state role remained.23 While the SPREs' role as gatekeeper is
limited to the exit gate from the student aid programs, it is not difficult to
12. Id. § 1099b(a)(7), (8).
13. Id. § 1099b(o).
14. Id. § 1099b(g).
15. Id. § 1099b(n)(1).
16. Id. § 1099b(n)(1), (3).
17. Id. § 1099b(1).
18. Id. §§ 1099a, 1099a-2.
19. Id. §§ 1099a(a), 1099a-3(b).
20. Id. § 1099a-3(d).
21. Id. § 1099a-3(d)(15).
22. H.R. 3553, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 497 (Oct. 11, 1991) (State Postsecondary Approving Agency
Program).
23. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 630, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 516, 523 (1992).
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envision circumstances under which that role would grow to include accrediting
agencies' control over the entrance and exit gates, thereby rendering the role
of accrediting agencies superfluous. As explained below, this possibility proved
to have a substantial effect upon the negotiated rulemaking and the resulting
regulations.
B. Negotiated Rulemaking Requirement
The HEA Amendments also specified how the Department was to develop
implementing regulations for the recognition of accrediting agencies and the
SPRP. The Department was required to convene regional meetings to obtain
public input on the formulation of proposed regulations.' After analyzing the
information provided at those meetings, the Department was to prepare an
initial draft of implementing regulations and "submit such regulations to a
negotiated rulemaking process. '
The HEA Amendments provided guidance on this process. The Department
was directed to follow the Recommendations of the Administrative Conference
of the United States on procedures for negotiating proposed regulations.'
Participants in the negotiations were to be selected from individuals nominated
by groups that attended the regional meetings. To the extent possible, the
negotiators were to represent the diversity of higher education.27 The Federal
Advisory Committee Act was declared inapplicable to the regional meetings and
the negotiated rulemaking.2  Final regulations were required to be issued
within 240 days of the enactment of the legislation-that is, by March 23,
1993-unless unforeseen circumstances compelled the Secretary to adhere to a
different schedule.29
III
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING PROCESS
A. Concept of Negotiated Rulemaking
The problems associated with traditional notice and comment rulemaking in
controversial areas affecting important interests are well known.3' The
rulemaking process is frequently time-consuming and costly. Participants, with
deeply held views or critical interests at stake, often take extreme positions and
24. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1098a(a) (West Supp. 1994).
25. Id. § 1098a(b).
26. Id. (citing recommendations codified at 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.82-4, 305.85-5(1994)).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1098a(c). This expedited the formation of the negotiating groups and eliminated the
requirement that negotiating sessions be open to the public. DAVID M. PRITZKER AND DEBORAH S.
DALTON, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF U.S., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 52-55
(1990) [hereinafter NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK].
29. 20 U.S.C.A. 99 1098a(b), 1232(g).
30. See Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. REG. 133 (1985).
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engage in adversarial conduct. Confronted with this behavior, administrative
agencies move cautiously or not at all. When the regulatory result fails to
satisfy one or more interest groups, as it almost always does, the regulations are
challenged in the courts. Judicial invalidation or suspension of regulations can
further protract the regulatory process. The quality of the rules that result from
traditional rulemaking is often suspect.31
The concept of negotiated rulemaking was proposed by Philip Harter in a
seminal article in 1982 as a potential solution to the problems associated with
traditional rulemaking.32 The central notion underlying the concept is that
direct negotiations among the administrative agency and the diverse interests
affected by proposed regulations can lead to the more efficient development of
final rules and a greater likelihood of consensus for them. Negotiated
rulemaking was never intended to be a panacea; if the process were improperly
implemented, it could lead to abuse or simply add another layer to an already
protracted rulemaking process. 33
A reasonably settled set of requirements and conditions for success in
negotiated rulemaking has now been determined. Indeed, the Recommenda-
tions of the Administrative Conference, cited in the HEA Amendments,
embody those requirements and conditions.' The Departments of Transporta-
tion, Labor, Interior, and Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Federal Trade Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have
used negotiated rulemaking to develop regulations. Of these, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency has the most experience with the process.
3 5
In "classic" negotiated rulemaking, the administrative agency engages a
convener who prepares a feasibility report.36 The convener identifies and
interviews interested parties, including the regulatory body,37 and forms a
prognosis for the negotiated rulemaking and a recommendation on whether to
proceed.38 If the agency proceeds with the process, it invites representatives
of identified interest groups to an organizational meeting. 39 At this meeting,
the parties attempt to agree upon a mission statement, the organizations that
will be members of the negotiating committee, and protocols by which the
31. Id. at 133-38.
32. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. W. 1 (1982).
33. See id. at 99-100, 110-13.
34. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF U.S., 1985 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 23 (1985)
(Recommendation 85-5, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations) [hereinafter 1985
PROCEDURES]; ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF U.S., 1982 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 21
(1982) (Recommendation 82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations) [hereinafter 1982
PROCEDURES]. Curiously, Congress did not cite the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590
(Supp. III 1991). Other sources of negotiated rulemaking precepts include NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 30, at 133.
35. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK; supra note 28, at 327-43.
36. 1982 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 23.
37. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28, at 97.
38. Id. at 100; 1982 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 24.
39. 1982 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 24.
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committee will conduct itself.4° If these agreements are reached, the commit-
tee, not the agency, then controls the negotiating process.
The usual goal of such a committee is the actual preparation of proposed
regulations along with an explanatory rationale for publication in the Federal
Register.41  The regulatory agency agrees to publish the product of the
negotiating committee's work as a notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM"),
and the interested parties represented on the committee agree not to comment
adversely upon or challenge legally the proposed rules.42 This requires all
parties, including the regulatory body, to be represented at the negotiating table
by persons of sufficient authority to commit the party they represent.43
Typically, the negotiating committee operates by consensus, usually defined as
the absence of dissent by any member. Under this distinction, no party may be
outvoted, but the failure to express disagreement is presumed to mean
consent." In addition, all agreements are presumed to be tentative until full
agreement on the regulatory package is reached. If no consensus can be
reached, the regulatory agency retains the discretion to propose its own rules.45
The negotiations themselves usually occur in discrete sessions, with
intervening periods for the parties to caucus. Work groups may be formed to
address particular issues or to prepare proposals for the committee as a whole
to consider.' The regulatory agency may have the particular role of helping
to frame proposals in accepted regulatory language. During the negotiations
phase of the process, however, the regulatory agency is merely one of the
interested parties.
47
The potential advantages of negotiated rulemaking are substantial. It
engages interested parties, who usually can be readily identified in advance,
directly and immediately in the process. It allows these parties to focus on their
interests, rather than their positions, which in turn encourages trade-offs. By
involving them in the details of the development of regulations, the process wins
their support for the regulatory product because it is their product. Negotiated
rulemaking diminishes the likelihood of adversarial conduct and later legal
challenges, and it builds legitimacy for the results. By "frontloading" dispute
into the negotiating committee, the process also reduces the time and cost of
promulgating final rules.
Inherent in the model described above are a number of conditions for the
success of negotiated rulemaking. There must be a balance of power among the
40. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28, at 177-78.
41. 1982 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 25; 1985 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 26.
42. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28, at 99.
43. Id. at 39; 1982 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 24 (recommending that agencies send a senior
official to negotiations).
44. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28, at 178.
45. See 1982 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 25.
46. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28, at 179-80.
47. Philip J. Harter, Experienced Practitioner Offers Guidance to Participants in Negotiated
Rulemaking, 2 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP. 80-86 (1988).
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parties, including the regulatory agency, such that negotiation and agreement
are better than "BATNA"-the best alternative to negotiated agreement.'
The number of interested parties must be limited.4 ' The issues must be ripe
for resolution, and they must be sufficiently multifarious to allow trade-offs.'
There should be opportunity for mutual gain, that is, "win-win" bargaining, and
no party should be required to relinquish its fundamental values in order to
achieve agreement.51  The parties should set a deadline for decision 52 and
should also appoint a neutral mediator to facilitate the negotiations. 53
An essential ingredient for success that was particularly pertinent to the
negotiated rulemaking under the HEA Amendments was the likelihood of
implementation of the negotiated agreement.' Since the purpose of the
process is to draft regulations rather than simply to provide more advice and
consultation to the regulatory agency, it is important that the agency agree to
publish the proposed regulations developed by the negotiating committee
verbatim in the form of an NPRM. This requires that the negotiators, including
the regulatory agency's representatives, have sufficient stature and authority to
make acceptance of the negotiated agreements likely.
55
B. Implementation by the Department of Education
The Department began its implementation of the negotiated rulemaking
required by the HEA Amendments within weeks after President Bush signed
the bill in July 1992. In August 1992, the Department invited a wide array of
interested parties to submit lists of issues to be addressed in the rulemaking and
convened meetings with these groups at its headquarters.56
In accordance with the HEA Amendments, the Department then held four
regional meetings in San Francisco, New York, Kansas City, and Atlanta in
September 1992.5' Any interested party could attend these meetings. The
meetings, attended by hundreds of participants, were divided into subgroups
addressing various topics. Separate sessions were held on accrediting agency
recognition and the SPREs. 5' For each session, the Department appointed a
chair and a reporter, and presented a consolidated list of issues developed from
48. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Development of
Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 863, 876 (1987).
49. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28, at 37.
50. Id. at 37-38.
51. See id. at 38.
52. Id. at 39.
53. Harter, supra note 47, at 80; see also 1985 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 26.
54. Harter, supra note 32, at 99-102.
55. Id.; see also 1985 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 26; 1982 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 24-5;
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28, at 39.
56. Letter from Carolyn Reid-Wallace, Assistant Secretary, Office of Postsecondary Educ., Dep't
of Educ., to Kenneth Perrin, President, Council on Postsecondary Accreditation (Aug. 12, 1992) (on
file with author).
57. See The Higher Education Amendments of 1992: Notice of Regional Meetings, 57 Fed. Reg.
38,640 (1992).
58. Id. at 38,639-40.
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the August meetings. Department staff attended the sessions but did not
participate. The purpose of the sessions was to obtain the views of the
nonfederal parties in attendance on the issues and to determine whether they
were in agreement on the resolution of those issues. 59
Attendees at the regional meetings nominated negotiators in October 1992.
The Department selected fifteen negotiators for the accreditation regulations in
November 1992. Included were representatives of institutional and programmat-
ic accrediting agencies, institutions of higher education, state higher education
offices, and a legal aid group.' The Department prepared an initial draft of
the proposed regulations and scheduled the first negotiating sessions for one
week in December 1992 and one week in January 1993.6" Since the Depart-
ment had not prepared a draft of the proposed regulations on the SPRP, no
negotiators for those sessions were appointed, and a negotiating session on those
regulations was not scheduled. Owing to scheduling conflicts, the sessions
announced by the Department were postponed to January and February
1993.62
A number of parties urged a further postponement in light of the upcoming
change of administrations as a result of the 1992 presidential elections. They
urged that negotiations would likely be more productive after the new political
leadership was in place at the Department. They also argued for postponement
because the regulations for each leg of the Program Integrity Triad should be
developed in a coordinated manner, and only the accreditation proposals had
been drafted. Pointing to the 240-day deadline, however, the remaining
leadership from the Bush Administration at the Department declined to suspend
the negotiating sessions.
Thus, the Department held negotiating sessions in the first week of January
and the first week of February of 1993.' The Department retained profession-
al mediators for each negotiating group and presented proposed organizational
protocols at a general meeting of all negotiators on the eve of the first session.
The proposed protocols were presented with little background or orientation on
their preparation or on negotiated rulemaking, and they elicited substantial
criticism and opposition from many of the negotiators. In particular, these
negotiators professed to be unable or unwilling to make binding commitments
on behalf of the organizations they represented. They also expressed concern
59. Id at 38,639.
60. See Letter from Carolyn Reid-Wallace, Assistant Secretary, Office of Postsecondary Educ.,
Dep't. of Educ., to author (Nov. 24, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Reid-Wallace letter];
Memorandum from Robert W. Evans, Director, Division of Policy, Training and Analysis Service, Dep't
of Educ., to Negotiators (Nov. 25, 1992) (on file with author).
61. Reid-Wallace letter, supra note 60, at 1-2.
62. Memorandum from Robert W. Evans, Director, Div. of Policy, Training and Analysis Servs.,
Dep't of Educ., to author (Dec. 1, 1992) (on file with author).
63. The Higher Education Amendments of 1992: Negotiated Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,533-34
(1992).
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that the Department agreed only to use any agreements reached during the
negotiations "to the maximum extent possible."64
As a result, the Department revised the protocols to eliminate provisions
obligating organizations represented by the negotiators not to comment
adversely on the regulations eventually presented in an NPRM or to challenge
the final regulations in court. For its part, the Department continued to agree
only to use any agreements to the maximum extent possible; it would publish
an NPRM "consistent with the agreement or explain in the preamble to the
NPRM why any changes have been made. ' During the second week of the
negotiations, the Department amplified its position: The new Secretary, Richard
Riley, informed the negotiators through Department staff that he would review
any agreements reached to determine whether they were acceptable. If they
were not, he might recall the negotiators for further meetings. If no agreement
were reached, the Department would simply make proposals as it saw fit.
The accreditation negotiating sessions themselves quickly became a two-
sided affair. The nonfederal negotiators, principally the representatives of
accrediting agencies and institutions of higher education, presented criticisms of
the draft that the Department had prepared, and the Department's representa-
tives, midlevel career civil servants, responded. In many areas, the Department
resisted changes to the proposals presented. In some areas, the Department's
representatives indicated a willingness to consider alternatives and even to agree
to modifications. Subsequently, however, after consultation with other
Department officials outside the negotiations, they would often recede from
these agreements and adhere to positions the Department had previously taken.
At the conclusion of the second and final week of negotiations in February,
consensus had been reached in a limited number of areas that had been at issue
when the discussions began in January.' Thereafter, the Department
extensively revised the proposed regulations and submitted them to the
negotiators in May 1993 for their "technical review and comment.' 67 Notwith-
standing the Department's assurance that it had kept to the substance of any
agreements that had been reached, a number of the negotiators disagreed and
argued that the revised draft departed substantively from a number of consensus
positions that had been achieved.'
64. Department of Educ., Draft Organizational Protocols 2-3 (Jan. 3, 1993) (on file with author).
65. Department of Educ., Organizational Protocols 2 (Jan. 6, 1993) (on file with author).
66. See Department of Educ., Draft Part 602, Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for the
Recognition of Accrediting Agencies (Feb. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
67. Letter from Carol F. Sperry, Acting Director, Institutional Participation and Oversight Servs.,
Dep't. of Educ., to author 1 (May 7, 1993) (on file with author).
68. See, e.g., James Rogers, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools, Comments on Part 602-Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for the Recognition of Accrediting
Agencies (May 17, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from author to Carol F. Sperry, Acting Director,
Institutional Participation and Oversight Servs., Dep't. of Educ. (May 17, 1993) (on file with author).
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The SPRE negotiating sessions were held in the last week of April 1993 and
the second week of June 1993.69 Again, fifteen negotiators were selected, and
the composition of the negotiators was much the same. Five of the nonfederal
negotiators in the accreditation sessions also served as negotiators in the SPRE
sessions. The Department's negotiating team was also similar to its team for the
accreditation regulations. As might be expected, state interests were more
significantly represented.70 The diluted protocols ultimately agreed upon for
the earlier accreditation sessions were readily accepted here as well.71
Time for discussion of the SPRE regulations was limited because proposed
regulations on an unrelated area-admission of ability-to-benefit students-was
included in the sessions. The presence of state interests also altered the
dynamic of the negotiations somewhat. The Department became more an
interested observer to disagreements between the state representatives (who
were generally satisfied with the Department's proposals and anxious to
implement the SPRP as quickly as possible) and representatives of institutions
of higher education and accreditors (who were fearful of state efforts to exercise
oversight authority over institutions and to supplant the functions of accrediting
agencies). Again, hopes raised by the willingness of Department representatives
to consider changes proposed by nonstate, nonfederal negotiators were
disappointed after consultations occurred outside the negotiations. The
frustrations of these negotiators resulted in a letter to Secretary Riley during the
second week of negotiations formally objecting that the Department was not
engaging in true negotiated rulemaking. 2  Although the newly appointed
Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education urged the negotiators in a
special meeting to persevere, no consensus was reached on any material issues
in the SPRE negotiations.73
An additional impediment throughout the negotiating sessions for both the
accreditation and SPRE regulations was the Department's refusal to disclose
and negotiate the terms of the preamble-the text providing the background
and rationale for the regulations. As the "legislative history" of the regulations,
the preamble would obviously be crucial to future understanding and interpreta-
tion. The nonfederal negotiators requested that they be provided with the
preamble at several points, but the Department's representatives declined to do
so during the negotiations. Instead, the preamble became a prospective but
unexaminable repository for points ostensibly to satisfy the concerns of
nonfederal negotiators.
69. The Higher Education Amendments of 1992: Negotiated Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,590
(1993).
70. Id.
71. Department of Educ., Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for Part B of the Title IV Higher
Education Amendments of 1992, Draft Organizational Protocols (Apr. 25, 1993) (on file with author).
72. Letter from Negotiators to Richard S. Riley, Secretary of Educ. (June 15, 1993) (on file with
author).
73. State Postsecondary Review Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 3604, 3605 (1994) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. § 667).
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C. Assessment of the Process
The negotiated rulemaking conducted by the Department was clearly flawed.
It departed extensively from the "classic" model of negotiated rulemaking that
has evolved since Mr. Harter's article in 1982, and it failed to follow the
precepts set forth in the Administrative Conference's Recommendations as
mandated by Congress.
Many of the conditions for successful negotiated rulemaking had been
present after the enactment of the HEA Amendments. "BATNA," the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement, pointed to negotiations as the preferred
way to promulgate regulations. The Department had been singularly
unsuccessful in promulgating regulations during the previous reauthorization
cycle, and thus it ought to have had an incentive to win the cooperation of the
higher education community.74 At the same time, the HEA Amendments
imposed many new and stringent requirements upon the participants in the
student financial assistance programs, and thus they had an incentive to work
with the Department to achieve reasonable interpretations of those provisions.
There was, therefore, an opportunity to gain through bargaining. Both the
Department and the parties represented in the negotiations faced the possibility
of severe loss in conventional notice and comment rulemaking.
Although the number of interests affected by the regulations was quite large,
the areas for regulation were reasonably discrete. The accreditation regulations
involved fifteen negotiators representing roughly five interests. The SPRE
regulations involved a similar array of interests. Those interests need not have
been irreconcilable. Except to the degree that some may not have conceded the
legitimacy of participation in the student aid programs of others, the parties'
fundamental values did not necessarily have to be relinquished.75
Other factors were also conducive to successful negotiations. Congress had
imposed a deadline which ought to have served as a spur to focused discussions.
Access to information was not critical; no party had the ability to influence the
negotiations unduly because it controlled crucial information. The mediator
chosen for the accreditation and SPRE negotiations was neutral, experienced,
and capable.
Yet the negotiation process failed. Relatively little consensus was achieved
in the accreditation sessions, and no consensus was achieved in the SPRE
sessions. Even with respect to the agreements reached in the accreditation
sessions, subsequent revisions provoked substantial protest by nonfederal
negotiators.
74. The Department was still promulgating regulations to implement the previous reauthorization
legislation when the HEA Amendments were under consideration. See, e.g., Pell Grant Program, 56
Fed. Reg. 56,912-17 (1991).
75. Some representatives of regional accreditors of colleges and universities and the states expressed
the view from time to time that the changes necessitated by the HEA Amendments were owing entirely
to abuses by proprietary schools and were being unfairly applied to all institutions of higher education.
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Events after the conclusion of the SPRE negotiations in June 1993 confirm
the failure of the negotiated rulemaking process. In response to the criticisms
levelled at the Department's conduct of the process, it convened a "debriefing"
session in September 1993. While the Department stressed that this was not a
negotiating meeting, it permitted participants to identify departures from
consensus, to request clarification, to identify and discuss pertinent issues not
previously raised, and to address overlap issues between sets of regulations, such
as the accreditation and SPRE rules.76 The Department also finally released
a draft of the preamble for the accreditation regulations. 77 Thus, the Septem-
ber debriefing sought after the fact to resolve dissatisfaction with the rulemaking
process.
Throughout the fall and winter, interested parties, including organizations
that had been directly or indirectly represented in the negotiated rulemaking,
lobbied the Department for changes in the proposed regulations.78  Target
dates for the publication of NPRMs were repeatedly missed. Obviously, these
developments would not have occurred had the negotiated rulemaking been
successful.
Finally, on January 24, 1994, ten months after the congressional deadline,
NPRMs were published in the Federal Register for the rules on recognition of
accrediting agencies and the State Postsecondary Review Program.79 Interest-
ed parties were allowed to comment until March 21, 1994.' More than 1800
comments were filed on the accreditation proposals, and a similar number were
filed on the SPRE proposals.8" The vast majority of these comments, including
those of parties represented in the negotiated rulemaking, were extremely
critical of the proposed rules and the process by which the proposals were
developed. If one of the aims of negotiated rulemaking is to "frontload"
criticism and thereby reduce the time required to develop regulations, the delay
in the issuance of the NPRMs and the response to them show that this aim was
not achieved.
76. Letter from David A. Longanecker, Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Educ., Dep't. of
Educ., to "Colleagues" (Sept. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
77. Department of Educ., Draft Part 602, Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for the Recognition
of Accrediting Agencies (Sept. 13, 1993) (on file with author). The preamble to the SPRE regulations
was not available for review at the debriefing.
78. Jim Zook, College Presidents Lobby Against New Accrediting Regulations, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Jan. 12, 1994, at A26; Jim Zook, Education Dept. Revises Controversial Draft of Accreditation
Regulations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 26, 1994, at A36.
79. Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for Recognition of Accrediting Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 3578
(1994) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 602) (notice of proposed rulemaking Jan. 24, 1994) [hereinafter
Accreditation NPRM]; State Postsecondary Review Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 3604 (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. § 667) (notice of proposed rulemaking Jan. 24, 1994) [hereinafter SPRE NPRM].
80. Accreditation NPRM, supra note 79, at 3578; SPRE NPRM, supra note 79, at 3604.
81. Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for Recognition of Accrediting Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg.
22,250, 22,253 (1994) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 602) [hereinafter Accreditation Final Regulations];
State Postsecondary Review Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,286, 22,288 (1994) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
§ 667) [hereinafter SPRE Final Regulations].
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The reason for this outcome was the absence of two of the accepted
conditions for success of negotiated rulemaking: the authority of the negotiators
to make binding commitments and the related likelihood of implementation of
agreements reached. At the very outset of the process, many of the nonfederal
negotiators disclaimed their authority to make agreements on behalf of the
organizations that they represented. For its part, the Department sent to the
negotiating table representatives who lacked the power to commit the
Department. This lack of authority was demonstrated both by their positions
within the Department-they were midlevel officers at most-and by the
repeated instances where apparent agreements were reversed after consultations
outside the negotiations.
The absence of decisionmakers on both sides of the bargaining table
undermined the likelihood of implementation of such agreements as could be
made. On the nonfederal side, provisions in the organizational protocols
forbidding the filing of adverse comments or legal challenges were stricken. On
the Department side, the protocols contemplated that the Department could
make changes to agreements since they permitted the Department to "explain
in the preamble to the NPRM why any changes have been made." Secretary
Riley also indicated that the Department reserved all its rights as to the
substance of the regulations.
The Department's decision to move forward with the process despite the
change of administrations and its failure to structure the process more in
keeping with the "classic" model of negotiated rulemaking largely account for
these deficiencies. Department representatives were unable to commit the
Department because its political leadership was in flux or absent. The first draft
of the accreditation regulations, for example, reflected the policy preferences of
a lame duck administration whose leaders were gone by the time the first
negotiating session began. Those leaders obviously could not sit at the
negotiating table, and the midlevel officials who actually were present could
only guess at the policy wishes of new leaders not yet chosen.
While Secretary Riley was quickly installed, he could not reasonably have
been expected to negotiate or even be conversant with the details of the
regulatory package so quickly. The critical decisionmaker was the Assistant
Secretary for Postsecondary Education in whose office responsibility for the
student aid programs lay. That post was not filled until June 1993-at the very
conclusion of the SPRE negotiations and months after the accreditation
negotiations.
It must be acknowledged that the inability of some of the nonfederal
negotiators to commit their organizations contributed to the failure of the
process. The Department's structuring decisions for the negotiations, however,
were primarily responsible for the positions these parties took. Rather than
involve the nonfederal parties in the selection of the mediators and especially
the preparation of the organizational protocols, the Department simply
presented them in a large group meeting with a sense of fait accompli on the
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eve of the first negotiating session. Lacking any orientation to the concept of
negotiated rulemaking or knowledge about the matters to which they were
being asked to give assent, these negotiators understandably pulled back from
surrendering rights that previous experience with the Department suggested
might be important.'
The negotiating sessions themselves exacerbated the difficulties. Instead of
numerous, relatively brief sessions with opportunities to caucus so that
constituents could be consulted and issues could be worked out over time, the
sessions were limited to two intensive weeklong sessions that predictably left
many issues unresolved. Further, by controlling and principally defending the
text of the proposed regulations, the Department assumed a dominant position
and was not just one of the negotiating parties. Its decision to withhold the
preamble and not to negotiate all of the Program Integrity Triad provisions in
a coordinated manner added to a sense that it was unwilling to give up any real
control of the regulatory product.
The Department's rejoinder to these objections, which were made from time
to time by some parties, was that the 240-day congressional deadline made the
approach that it had chosen necessary. Yet events robbed this point of any
force that it might have ever had. Most obviously, the Department did not
meet the deadline. Six months after it, the Department was convening a
debriefing to offer palliatives for the objections of the participants. It did not
publish NPRMs until four months after the debriefing, and it did not promul-
gate final regulations for more than a year after the end of the 240-day period
specified by Congress. Thus, there clearly was an opportunity for more
adequate preparation and negotiating sessions consistent with the generally
accepted model of negotiated rulemaking. And, in any event, the 240-day
requirement left the Secretary the latitude to extend the schedule for good
cause, an option that he must have exercised in view of the failure to meet the
deadline.
In sum, the Department did have the ability to engage the parties more
deeply in the process, thereby winning a greater contribution and commitment
to the regulatory product. It chose not to do so, it would appear, because of a
desire to create the impression of progress in accordance with perceived
congressional wishes. In so doing, it created only the facade of negotiated
rulemaking.
82. The Administrative Conference and other authorities on negotiated rulemaking suggest such
training and orientation before the negotiations begin. 1985 PROCEDURES, supra note 34, at 26;
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK, supra note 28, at 161-63.
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EFFECT ON REGULATIONS
A. Accreditation Regulations
On balance, the negotiated rulemaking had little effect on the regulatory
product. The essential themes of the initial draft of proposed accreditation
regulations in November 1992 were (1) conversion of accreditation from a peer
review to a regulatory/compliance process, (2) reliance on minimum quantitative
standards-trip wires-for determining compliance, (3) requirements that
accrediting agencies take action when noncompliance is found, (4) greater use
of accrediting agencies to assist the Department in the performance of its
functions, (5) a two-tier approach to focus more stringent requirements upon
agencies accrediting "prebaccalaureate vocational education programs." and (6)
more rigor and detail in the recognition process.8 3
Those themes remained in the Accreditation NPRM published in January
1994. Thus, the proposed regulations greatly elaborated on the statutory
requirement that accrediting agencies have standards addressing the twelve
specified areas and prescribed the content of many accrediting standards.8
Agencies would have been required to have standards establishing minimum
and maximum program lengths and minimum quantitative standards for
completion rates, job placement rates, and pass rates on licensing examina-
tions. The Accreditation NPRM also suggested that acceptable ratios
between tuition and expected earnings be established.' Further, the proposed
regulations would have required accrediting agencies to be notified of and
approve in advance additions to or substantive changes in educational
programs.' Additionally, when an agency determined that an institution or
program was out of compliance with any standard, the agency would have been
obliged to take prompt adverse action or to require the institution or program
to come into compliance within an eighteen-month period.'
The Accreditation NPRM thus reflected the Department's desire to make
greater use of accrediting agencies to enforce Title IV of the HEA. In addition
to the disclosures required by the HEA, the proposed regulations would have
required accrediting agencies to provide the Secretary upon request with
information to assist in "resolving problems" with accredited institutions.89
The NPRM also suggested that agencies be obligated to provide to the
83. Department of Educ., Draft Part 602, Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for the Recognition
of Accrediting Agencies (Nov. 10, 1992) (on file with author).
84. Accreditation NPRM, supra note 79, at 3597-98.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 3586-87.
87. Id. at 3597.
88. Id. at 3588.
89. Id. at 3593.
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Inspector General all instances of "fraudulent activities."' The proposals on
substantive changes, minimum quantitative standards, and unannounced visits
to institutions offering vocational education were limited in the Accreditation
NPRM to prebaccalaureate vocational education programs because abuses have
purportedly been centered in those programs.91
The Accreditation NPRM proposed procedures for recognition in consider-
able detail. In this area, the negotiations did have some impact. The right of
an agency to respond to adverse findings and negative comments was
incorporated as was the right to proceedings on the record.' The proposed
regulations further provided for the statement of the basis for any adverse
decisions and some semblance of an appeal.93 All of these basic procedural
protections were lacking when the negotiated rulemaking began.'
On April 29, 1994, the Department published final regulations for the
recognition of accrediting agencies. In contrast to the negotiated rulemaking,
the notice and comment process appeared to have had a substantial effect on
the regulatory product. All elaboration of the statutory topics which accrediting
standards must address was eliminated.9" Requirements for quantitative
standards, or "trip wires," for completion, placement, pass rates on licensing
examinations, and tuition and fees were deleted.' The final regulations also
excised the "prebaccalaureate vocational education" concept.97 The commen-
tary accompanying the final regulations rejected the proposition that abuses
have predominated at vocational institutions and stated that the regulations
should apply evenly to all sectors of higher education." These were all
significant modifications to aspects of the regulations that had been present
throughout the rulemaking process.
Nonetheless, the final regulations continued in important respects to
confirm the conversion of accreditation from a collegial, peer review process to
an administrative, regulatory process. The requirement for prior approval of
new and substantially different programs remained in the final regulations."
Requirements that accrediting agencies provide information to assist the
Secretary in "resolving problems" and on "fraud and abuse" at institutions were
also retained.1" Even in the area of accrediting standards, the commentary
to the regulations stated that, in setting standards, accrediting agencies were to
take into account, and not set standards lower than, federal and state standards
90. Id. at 3581.
91. Id. at 3580, 3584, 3586, 3587.
92. Id. at 3593-94.
93. Id.
94. See Department of Educ., Draft Part 602, Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for the
Recognition of Accrediting Agencies 3-6 (Nov. 10, 1992) (on file with author).
95. Accreditation Final Regulations, supra note 81, at 22,260.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 22,252.
98. Id. at 22,264.
99. Id. at 22,259-60.
100. Id. at 22,255.
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in comparable areas.1' The final regulations and accompanying commentary
heavily emphasized the concept of accountability-if accrediting agencies do not
adopt and enforce rigorous standards or if the performance of their accredited
institutions is poor, the Department will remove recognition'
°2
B. State Postsecondary Review Entity Regulations
From an accreditor's perspective, the SPRE regulations were highly resistant
to change throughout the process. The principal features in the initial draft in
April 1993 were as follows: (1) ceding to the states the discretion to choose
whether to contract with accrediting agencies or "peer review systems" of
unknown provenance and refusal to require such peer review systems to be
subject to Departmental review and approval; (2) refusal to provide for
interested party input on items to be submitted to the Department for review
and approval, such as state review standards, plans and budgets for review, and
funding applications; (3) minimum quantitative standards for completion,
placement, and pass rates, and acceptable percentages for the relationship
between tuition and fees and expected remuneration; (4) latitude for different
standards for different types of institutions; and (5) refusal to permit the states
the right to choose not to participate in the SPRP without institutions in the
state incurring sanctions specified in the statute. 03
The SPRE NPRM contained all of these elements. The proposed
regulations left to the states the determination whether to use a recognized
accrediting agency or a peer review system to perform the quality review
mandated by the statute."° It also left to the SPRE the evaluation of the
qualifications of such peer review systems. 5 The SPRE NPRM did somewhat
grudgingly note and request comment on accreditors' proposals that the
Secretary define "peer review system" and specify criteria to determine the
competence of these systems, but it indicated a disinclination to preserve much
of a role for accrediting agencies in this area."
The SPRE NPRM made no provision for interested party review and
comment upon the various state submissions to the Department required under
the HEA Amendments and the proposed regulations."°' During the negotiat-
ed rulemaking, both the Department's representatives and state representatives
rejected any such proposals from accreditors and institutions of higher education
because they believed these procedures would unduly delay the implementation
of the SPRE program.
101. Id. at 22,251.
102. Id. at 22,250, 22,263, 22,271.
103. Department of Educ., Draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 667, State Postsecondary
Review Program (Apr. 16, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Draft Notice].
104. SPRE NPRM, supra note 79, at 3621-22.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 3614-15.
107. See id. at 3619-22.
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The SPRE NPRM also reflected some movement on the use of quantitative
measures in the criteria for state review standards. The initial draft of the
regulations presented to the negotiators was highly detailed on this score and
proposed specific trip wires for determining when an institution being reviewed
would be deemed out of compliance." s These specific tests were criticized by
all nonfederal negotiators, including state representatives. The Department
dropped them in the SPRE NPRM but still proposed that state review standards
on outcomes and tuition and fees be quantified."°
The latitude of the SPREs to ;create differential standards actually
broadened throughout the process. The initial draft of the regulations did not
specifically so provide."' When the initially proposed trip wires were
eliminated, the draft was revised to permit this possibility."' Further, the
SPRE NPRM proposed to restrict the definition of "vocational program," which
limits the applicability and effect of the placement standard, to the prebaccalau-
reate level. 112  Finally, the SPRE NPRM, like all drafts of the proposed
regulations, refused to recognize the right of a state to decline to participate in
the SPRE program. " 3 The Department's refusal again reflected a desire to
implement the SPRE program as widely as possible. " 4
The final regulations for the SPRE program were also published on April
29, 1994. The Department made few changes to the proposals presented in the
SPRE NPRM. Although it specified some minimal criteria for the selection of
other "peer review systems," the Department left to the states the choice of
whether to use these systems or recognized accrediting agencies.15 The
Department also rejected as unduly burdensome proposals to allow third parties
to review and comment upon state review standards, review plans and budgets,
and applications for funds.116 Further, the final regulations retained minimum
quantitative standards for outcomes and the provision permitting different
108. For example, the initial proposed regulations provided for a minimum completion rate of 67%,
a minimum placement rate of 70%, and a minimum pass rate on licensing examinations of 80%. Draft
Notice, supra note 103, at 24-25.
109. SPRE NPRM, supra note 79, at 3621.
110. See Draft Notice, supra note 103, at 20-27.
111. Department of Educ., Draft Part 667, State Postsecondary Review Program 31 (Sept. 13, 1993)
(on file with author).
112. SPRE NPRM, supra note 79, at 3606.
113. Id. at 3617. This right turns upon the admittedly fine distinction in the statute between a state
that "declines" and a state that "fails" 'to enter into an agreement with the Secretary to carry out the
program. Compare 20 U.S.C.A. § 1099a(b) (West Supp. 1994) with id. § 1099a(c). In the latter case,
the statute imposes severe penalties on institutions in the state. Id. Representatives of institutions of
higher education, in particular, had contended that a state could decline to participate without these
penalties becoming applicable.
114. Indeed, the Department and the states implemented many aspects of the SPRE program before
the SPRE NPRM was even published. See Department of Educ., State Postsecondary Program Status
Report (Jan. 1994) (on file with author) (chart of states, SPRE designations, receipt and approval of
agreements and plans); accord SPRE NPRM, supra note 79, at 3610.
115. SPRE Final Regulations, supra note 81, at 22,297.
116. Id. at 22,309.
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standards for different types of institutions."7 Finally, the regulations failed
to recognize the right of a state to decide not to participate in the SPRE
program." 8
In general, the Department elected to defer substantially to the states. The
final regulations and accompanying commentary were filled with expressions of
trust in the states' proper implementation of the SPRE program and refusals to
adopt provisions that would limit their discretion or hold them accountable." 9
In contrast to the accrediting agency recognition regulations, the SPRE
regulations contained no provisions to measure SPRE performance."2
V
CONCLUSION
The notice and comment phase of the rulemaking on the regulations
affecting accreditation confirmed the failure of the negotiated rulemaking.
Accrediting agencies, institutions of higher education, and higher education
associations all heavily criticized the proposals presented in the NPRMs, and
these criticisms had some effect. However, if one of the aims of negotiated
rulemaking is to frontload criticism and avoid later adversarial conduct and
expenditure of resources, these developments clearly showed that the process
did not succeed here.
If properly implemented, the negotiated rulemaking could have had a
substantively beneficial effect. Concededly, many aspects of the proposed
regulations were compelled by statute. Required accrediting standards,
unannounced visits, and broader disclosure requirements were all mandated in
some detail by Congress. Similarly, the enhanced role of the states, triggers for
SPRE review, and the state review standards were spelled out in the HEA
Amendments with considerable specificity.
Nevertheless, the Department's fundamental refusal to cede any real control
of the regulatory process, coupled with ill-advised administrative decisions
during the transition from the Bush to the Clinton Administrations, resulted in
two sets of regulations that pushed the "governmentalization" of control of
access to the student aid programs materially farther than that specified by
Congress. By permitting a genuine exchange of views and trade-offs between
accreditors and institutions on the one hand and federal and state governments
on the other, a true negotiated rulemaking would have recognized the continued
vitality and need for a nongovernmental role in the administration of these
programs. In turn, accrediting agencies and accredited institutions might have
come to accept more fully the legitimate demands for accountability of students,
their families, and government. Instead, the process was effectively transmuted
117. Id. at 22,295.
118. Id. at 22,290.
119. E.g., id. at 22,300, 22,302-06, 22,311.
120. Id. at 22,310.
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into a more elaborate version of notice and comment rulemaking, with its
concomitant adversarial conduct, time, cost, and, most importantly, resistance
to the legitimacy of its results. Negotiated rulemaking under the HEA
Amendments was a missed opportunity.
